Introduction
The extent of demonetisation of Russia's transition economy is striking. According to the Russian Economic Barometer, in 1998 about 55% of inter-firm transactions were made through barter, while the 1998 Institute for the Economy in Transition survey reports a share of 40% (with another 10% carried out in vecksels). There are a number of competing theories offering explanations of the spread of barter in Russia. The most common explanation is the liquidity squeeze. Commander and Mummsen (1998) report that most managers believe the lack of liquidity to be the major cause of barter. The other main explanation is that nonmonetary transactions are a strategic choice made by managers. Karpov (1997) and Gaddy and Ickes (1998) suggest that barter may be used by managers to hide revenues from outside owners and creditors (including the tax authorities) and delay restructuring. In this paper we will try to reconcile both views in a single model.
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These two theories (lack of liquidity and the delay in restructuring) are based on very different assumptions and suggest rather different policy implications. The liquidity hypothesis is based on the idea that there is no conflict of interest between managers and investors. The managers choose the strategies that are best for the firm. Barter is involuntary: there is no way of selling for cash since most of the firm's customers do not have any. The managers simply react to the temporary liquidity problems. Therefore, if we assume that the lack of liquidity is the cause of barter, in order to reduce barter it is necessary to loosen monetary policy and make sure that more credit is injected into firms.
On the other hand, the model underlining the role of the lack of restructuring assumes that outside investors have little control over managers and cannot make sure that value-enhancing restructuring is undertaken. Therefore this theory suggests that barter is a result of poor corporate governance 6 and until the protection of investors' rights is improved, lending to such firms will not help to reduce barter. Managers will continue to divert cash for personal consumption (e.g. through offshore firms). Once the cash is taken out of the real sector, the firms' liquidity constraints are not relaxed, so there is no change in real output. On the other hand, the increased consumer demand results in inflation. Hence, the question of whether barter should be explained by temporary liquidity shocks or by the strategic behaviour of managers is not of purely academic interest but has important policy implications, too.
Let us try to provide a consistent formulation of each theory. The lack of restructuring theory assumes that non-monetary transactions are less transparent and therefore make transfer pricing and asset stripping easier for the incumbent management. The liquidity hypothesis states that barter is an involuntary response of managers to the lack of cash. If firm A has to pay firm B for goods supplied and firm A currently has no cash, A may offer B payment in kind. Then B will not be able to pay its own supplier C in cash and will, likewise, have to pay 5 Given the extent of demonetisation, it is little wonder that there are quite a few other theories and explanations. Hendley et al. (1997) refer to poor payment systems and tax evasion, Marin and Schnitzer (1999) and Carlin et al. (2000) provide evidence that barter can help fight disorganisation, Guriev and Kvassov (2000) show that market concentration is an important determinant of barter. Drebentsov and al. (1999) suggest that the main source of non-monetary transactions is the government's subsidies to inefficient firms. In this paper, we will concentrate on the lack of liquidity and the delay in restructuring models, since those are mutually exclusive while the other theories complement one other. 6 Formally, Russian law provides a rather high degree of investor rights protection. On the other hand, Gelfer, Pistor and Raiser (2000) show that what really influence's a firm's ability to raise external finance is not the legislation in place, but the effectiveness of legal institutions. See Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2000) for discussion of the differences between intended and actual performance of bankruptcy procedures in Russia. C in kind. Certainly, this logic raises a number of questions. First, suppose that A has a cash windfall. Then A may not want to use it to pay B since A know that B will accept barter because B knows that C will accept barter etc. Hence, A may well use the cash for its personal consumption (see Kuznetsov (2000) and Yakovlev (1999) for a detailed account from case studies and the evidence in Guriev and Ickes (2000) ). The other question that arises is why firms do not borrow cash from banks. The liquidity constraint story implies that the firms are profitable, and there are enough expected future revenues to make repayment possible. However, due to the problem of moral hazard discussed above, there can be no commitment to repayment. Moreover, if B owes money to a bank, B may actually prefer A to pay in kind since the non-monetary transactions are much less transparent for outside creditors. This point is at the heart of the lack of restructuring theory: the liquidity shortage is endogenous, being a consequence of the poor protection of creditors' rights.
Therefore, these two explanations of barter should not be discussed separately: the liquidity shortage is linked to a lack of credit which in turn is related to a lack of investor's control over managers. The goal of our paper is to explore the link between debt and barter in the presence of imperfect institutions. Many authors have suggested that debt overhang is equivalent to a "100% tax on monetary transactions" (Hendley et al. (1997) ) and therefore provides incentives for barter. 7 The manager uses barter to avoid the "tax" that would wipe out the firm's working capital and would therefore result in under-utilisation of capacities. This means that barter is actually good since it makes it possible to sustain an efficient output level. However, the transaction costs of barter (including legal, search, transportation and storage costs) are high. It is therefore clear why the same outcome cannot be achieved without barter, namely, why the creditors would not agree to postpone debt payments. If the firm only suffers from a temporary liquidity shortage but is solvent in the long-term, the creditor should agree to refinance the debt. The firm will then have an incentive to sell for cash, use the cash for purchasing inputs and pay the debt later. We explicitly model the game with renegotiation and show that when debt restructuring occurs, it does reduce the incentive to barter. On the other hand, the threat of cash diversion by the manager may prevent debt restructuring. Anticipating the failure of debt restructuring, the manager would then still prefer barter. This is the most striking and original feature of the model: debt renegotiation is not sufficient to eradicate the barter phenomenon -the risk of cash diversion distorts the creditor's incentive to participate in the renegotiation process.
Our model therefore implies that in the presence of a cash diversion risk (similar to the "transformation risk" introduced in Myers and Rajan (1998) ), barter is a serious threat to outside creditors. As in most debt overhang models, we take the initial level of debt as given. On the other hand the results of the model suggest that the rational creditors should avoid lending to Russian firms until contract enforcement is improved. This is fairly consistent with the fact that bank credit is very low in Russia (EBRD (1999) ).
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Our model adds an interesting dimension to the stock of literature dealing with soft budget 7 Linz and Krueger (1998) or Aukutsionek (1998) interpret barter as a mechanism used to avoid undue bankruptcy when barter is due to liquidity shortage in a context of imperfect financial market conditions and of credit market imperfections. 8 Formally, our model applies to the relationship with outside creditors. However, it also describes well the interaction with all creditors whose rights are not protected. A good example of this is wage arrears. Workers (creditors) know that if the manager uses the cash for purposes other than payment of wages due, they will not be paid. Therefore they insist the firm pay their wages whenever it has any cash available. To avoid paying off wage arrears, managers use barter. See Earle and Sabirianova (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of wage arrears in Russia.
constraints. As shown in G. Roland and E. Berglöf (1998) , the soft budget constraint usually arises because creditors lack the ability to liquidate the indebted firm when it should be liquidated. In our model, where only the ex post situation is considered, the creditors would like to refinance the firm which is productive ex post but the refinancing fails due to a lack of commitment on the manager's side. Thus the manager chooses inefficient barter in order to avoid liquidation.
The empirical section (Section 3) shows that firm-level evidence is consistent with the model's predictions. We use two different data sources : the Russian Economic Barometer over 1995-96 on a quarterly basis, and the Institute for the Economy in Transition survey matched with the Goskomstat dataset for 1996 and 1997. Section 4 concludes and discusses the main policy implications.
The Model
In this Section, we suggest a simple model that describes the behaviour of a liquidity constrained firm with outside debt. The firm faces the following choice: if it pays off the debt, it will be stripped of working capital and will not be able to purchase inputs for the next round of production. Therefore the firm would rather hide the cash. One way of doing this is to sell by barter that has no value to the outside creditor (and thus cannot be expropriated by the creditor). Even if barter is costly, it makes it possible to postpone debt payments and finance another round of production which may then make it possible to pay off the debt.
This explanation of the link between liquidity constraint and barter is not, however, fully consistent. Indeed, if the firm is efficient and each additional round of production adds value, why would the creditor not voluntarily restructure the debt? Since forgiving/refinancing the debt should lead to an increased utilisation of the firm's efficient capacities, voluntary renegotiation would result in the delaying of debt service. This argument is common in literature concerning financial contracting in developed countries 9 and debt relief in developing economies 10 , so it is not at all clear why it should not apply to a transition economy.
We provide two alternative answers to this puzzle. First, it turns out that even in the presence of renegotiation, the risk of cash diversion by the firm's manager (so called "transformation risk") may cause barter to emerge. Second, if the creditor has access to investment opportunities that the firm does not have, and if these opportunities yield very high returns, as in the case of Russia's government bond bubble, the creditor will not be interested in debt restructuring.
At the core of the model is the lack of effective bankruptcy procedures. Unlike the conventional models of debt (Hart, 1995) , we assume that the creditor cannot gain control of the firm's assets if the firm breaches the debt contract. The assets that the creditor can take over if debt payments are not made on time are limited to cash; barter payments cannot be expropriated by the creditor, nor can he replace the manager.
The setting
There are two agents: a firm F and an outside creditor C. F owes C debt D 0 > 0. The firm has a unit of output and no cash. The firm may sell the output either for cash or for barter and use the revenue to purchase inputs. The relative prices in the cash market are better for the firm than those in the barter market: barter transactions involve high legal, transportation and storage costs. On the other hand, cash revenues can be captured by the creditor while barter revenues cannot. Cash revenues are accrued to F's current account which the creditor can easily seize. In-kind payments have no value to the creditor and can only be used as inputs in F's production. There are two periods. 11 The timing is as in Figure 1 . At time t=0, F has a unit of output and can choose whether to sell it for cash or for barter. The share of output to be sold for cash is m 0 and the share of output to be sold for barter is b (m 0 +b≤1). The cash prices of output and input are normalised to 1: selling m 0 for cash, F gets m 0 rubles that can buy m 0 units of input. The relative barter prices for inputs are β∈ [0, 1] where (1-β) represents the transaction costs of barter. Thus, selling b for barter, F gets βb units of input. At time t=1, the debt is due. F and C observe F's cash revenues and can renegotiate the contract. They bargain over a new contract (P,D 1 ) where P is the payment at time t=1 and D 1 is the new debt due at t=2. If the renegotiation succeeds, F's cash balance becomes m 1 =m 0 -P, and F promises to pay D 1 at t=2. If the renegotiation fails, C takes P=min{m 0 ,D 0 } and invests it elsewhere.
12 In this case, F only has
After the renegotiations, F buys inputs for cash. The firm spends x∈[0,m 1 ] rubles on inputs, so that the total amount of inputs the firm can use for production is q = βb + x.
11 The two-period setting is chosen to simplify the analysis. Apparently the finite horizon model or infinite horizon model with discounting would produce similar results. 12 The existing contract gives C a right to claim D 0 but F cannot physically pay more than m 0 because of the liquidity constraint. 13 Hereinafter [⋅] + denotes max{⋅,0}.
The firm has linear technology that converts q units of input into λq units of output. The maximum capacity is one unit of input: q≤1. Therefore the capacity constraint never binds
Once the output λq is produced, F decides again whether to sell it for cash or for barter. The cash revenues m 2 ∈ [0, λq] can again be confiscated by the creditor if the debt has not yet been repaid. The remaining cash is used for consumption by F's owners. Then the game ends.
The gross interest rate in the economy is normalised to 1. Therefore the creditor's and the firm's payoffs are respectively:
and
Assumptions
1. For simplicity's sake we will make a few assumptions concerning the firm's productivity λ and transaction costs of barter 1-β:
The first inequality implies that barter is less efficient than money: β < 1. The second inequality states that the firm's productivity is high enough to ensure that even with the relative prices β, the firm adds value: λβ > 1. Together, these two inequalities imply that the firm adds value to the cash prices as well: λ > 1. The last (technical) condition makes the problem less trivial. If the firm were too productive λ > 2, renegotiation would always postpone debt service. The gains from another round of production would be so large that they would always overcome the transformation risk (i.e. F's diversion of cash m 1 for current consumption). 14 2. F has all bargaining power. This is again a simplifying assumption. We give all the bargaining power to the firm in order to show that even if F is the residual claimant, cash may still be expropriated which would provide incentives for barter.
3. Parties have symmetric information: creditors are perfectly aware that their rights might be violated. The problem we are dealing with is a problem of enforcement, which can be analysed within the framework of incomplete contracts. C knows that there is no mechanism to enforce a contract that obliges F to use cash for buying inputs rather than for personal consumption.
4. Cash has the same value for both parties but barter can only be used as an input in production using the technology owned by F. Technology is inalienable. Even if F breaches the debt contract, C cannot take control of the productive assets.
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14 This condition is related to the fact that we only have two periods. If there were T periods, the constraint would be λ<T. 15 The conventional explanation of this assumption lies in the inalienable nature of human capital. Although it may be applicable to Russia, we have in mind a much bigger problem: the absence of effective bankruptcy procedures. In Russia, creditors have a hard time claiming the assets of bankrupt firms (see Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2000) ). Thus even physical capital is inalienable. Certainly, it is much easier for creditors to get hold of liquid assets (cash).
The first best
Apparently, the social optimum is to sell for cash, buy one unit of input and produce at maximum capacity. In other words, b=0, m 0 =1, q=1, m 2 =λq. Social welfare equals λ.
There are three potential sources of inefficiency in the model. First, selling for barter rather than for cash. Barter sales involve transaction costs (1-β)b. The second source of inefficiency is the failure of debt renegotiations: if C takes all the cash F has at t=1, F produces below social optimum q<1, and therefore a dead weight loss (λ-1)(1-q) arises.
The third problem is the cash diversion (transformation) risk: even if debt payments are postponed and F keeps some cash, F may prefer to spend it for consumption right away rather than to purchase inputs. As in Myers and Rajan (1998) we assume that the more liquid the asset is, the higher the transformation risk is. A manager has more discretion in using liquid assets, and therefore outside investors have less control over the manager the more liquid the assets are. The transformation risk often appears in literature on incomplete financial contracts where the only contractible variable is the payment from one party to the other, while the levels of inputs and outputs are not contractible. In our model, the manager can easily transform cash for his private benefit while the in-kind payments (inputs) can only be used for production.
The first best can be implemented if there is effective bankruptcy legislation. 16 Indeed, let us assume for a moment, that Assumption 4 does not hold. Thus, if F does not pay C, C can replace the manager and manage the firm himself. Then F knows that selling for barter will not help: if F sells for barter so that there is not enough cash to repay the debt, C takes over. C uses the inputs b for production, and the previous manager gets nothing.
No renegotiations
Let us first study what happens if renegotiation at t=1 is not allowed. We will solve the model via backward induction. First, we will find m 2 under given x, P, D 1 , m 0 and b. Second, we will determine x given P, D 1 , m 0 and b. Then we will find P and D 1 , given m 0 and b. Finally, we will describe the choice of m 0 and b. The ultimate goal of our analysis is to establish to what extent the choice between money and barter depends on debt D 0 .
The choice between money and barter at t=2 is trivial. Since barter can only be used for production, it makes no sense to sell in the last period for barter. 17 Hence, m 2 =λq.
The amount of inputs bought for cash
This function is convex with regard to x. Therefore the solution must be a corner one: either x = 0 or x = m 0 -P. Let us check when F prefers x = m 0 -P. Using all available cash to buy inputs provides F with a higher payoff whenever [λβb +λ(m 0 -P)-
Since m 0 -P ≥ 0, this condition is equivalent to:
Let us find the first-period payments P and the second period debt D The Proposition is quite intuitive. Indeed, if there are no renegotiation, the creditor will seize all the cash that the firm gets for its sales. Stripped of the working capital, the firm would not be able to continue production at a reasonably high level. In order to protect its working capital, the firm chooses to hide the revenues from the creditor via selling for barter. Although inefficient (β<1), barter makes it possible to avoid the expropriation of working capital while facilitating buying inputs. Being able to produce in the second period, the firm gets cash and partially or fully repays the debt. 
The model with renegotiations
The model above assumes that renegotiation is not allowed and that the creditor seizes all the cash the firm has at t=1. Apparently, this may be myopic: by restructuring the debt, the creditor would encourage the firm to produce more in the next period. This, in turn, would increase the creditor's chances of getting his money back. Debt restructuring may therefore provide the ex ante incentives for the firm to sell for cash rather than for barter. F knows that C will not expropriate all the cash right away, so there is no need to hide revenues in the form of barter and to pay for the cost of barter. In this Section, we study a model with renegotiation and check to which extent renegotiation may help to reduce barter.
Again, we will solve the model via backward induction. Apparently, the choice of m 2 and x under given P, D 1 , m 0 and b are the same as in the previous Section. In the second period, F sells for cash: m 2 =λq. The amount of inputs bought for cash is x = m 0 -P whenever (3) holds and x = 0 otherwise. Now consider the debt renegotiation. The firm and the creditors bargain on P and D 1 to maximise the joint surplus of F and C at the date t=1. At this point, the choice between money and barter m 0 and b has already been made, so that the renegotiation only effects the last period of debt overhang and therefore F's incentives to produce more output. If P and D 1 are such that (3) holds, then F uses the remaining cash -if any is left -to buy inputs and produce more. Otherwise the manager immediately diverts the remaining cash for personal consumption and only uses inputs already bought for barter. The parties' payoffs calculated at t=1 are as follows:
1. Inequality (3) holds (no diversion):
Since F has all the bargaining power, F chooses P and D 1 to maximise U F subject to the
It is easy to show that case 2 is not relevant. The aim of renegotiation is to postpone debt payments to leave some cash for input purchases. If the firm uses the cash for current consumption and if x=0, then there is no case for renegotiation. Thus, the second case will never occur in equilibrium. To make sure that it does not happen, the parties will agree on a contract P, D 1 that satisfies the constraint (3) and therefore prevents the firm from diverting the cash. Unfortunately, the constraint (3) may be binding which may distort the choice of P , D 1 : the diversion never happens but the threat of diversion may prevent the parties from achieving the first best. Thus, renegotiation reduces barter but does not eliminate it altogether. Why is this? The key is the cash diversion risk: the firm's manager cannot ensure he will not divert cash for current consumption rather than for purchasing inputs. The reason why the firm's manager may be interested in diversion is the remaining debt overhang. If the debt is rescheduled, and the second-period debt burden is too high, the firm expects to receive too little of the cash revenues m 2 . Therefore diversion is likely to happen. Diversion can be prevented by reducing the second period debt overhang, but this is costly. To compensate the creditor for the lower second-period return, F has to pay more in the first period which in turn provides F with the wrong ex ante incentives: F knows that it will have to pay something in the first period and will prefer to have as little cash and as much barter as possible.
Bubble
The analysis above shows that renegotiation may help to decrease barter. However, renegotiation does not always occur. One explanation is the famous free-rider problem. If there are many creditors, then it will be hard for them to agree on the renegotiation outcome since each of them will want a free ride at the others' expense. Another important explanation of the failure of renegotiation to eliminate barter may be the presence of a financial bubble that pays a high real interest rate. During 1995-98, the Russian government bond (GKO) market paid out very high real returns. Since the bubble burst in August 1998, barter levels have been steadily decreasing. We will introduce the GKO market in the following way.
Suppose that the creditor has an investment opportunity that pays off a gross interest rate δ>λ. The firm does not have access to this opportunity. At the time of renegotiation, the parties of cash m 1 for current consumption): the relationships between barter and debt vanish.
expect the following payoffs:
Solving the model by backward induction, we obtain the equilibrium which is equivalent in real terms to the equilibrium without renegotiation. Indeed, m 2 =λq, x= m 0 -P if (3) holds and x=0 otherwise. The renegotiation ends up with P =min{m 0 ,D 0 } and D 1 =[D 0 -m 0 ] + . Indeed, C is not interested in the second period payments unless F offers δ second-period rubles for each first-period one. But this does not happen: F's internal rate of return is λ. Thus, the choice between money and barter at t=0 is precisely the same as in the model without renegotiation.
Certainly, stripping the firm of its working capital and buying the bonds is locally efficient: the coalition of F and C makes more money via investing in GKO rather than through buying inputs and producing. We should not forget, though, that δ is not a market rate of return. Rather, it is a growth rate of a bubble. The cost of capital in the economy is still normalised to one, and therefore redirecting the cash from the real sector to the bond market is not efficient for the economy as a whole. 20 3
Empirical results

The empirical strategy
The model in Section 2 predicts a positive relationship between the level of outside debt and the share of barter in sales. Therefore, controlling for other explanations of barter, we should expect indebted firms to resort to barter more often. We run OLS estimates for the share of barter in sales for two firm-level datasets: the Russian Economic Barometer (REB) survey and the Barter in Russian Industrial Firms (BRIF) dataset (IET survey matched with the Goskomstat database of Russian firms). The indepedendent variables are debt as a ratio of annual sales in the beginning of the period, regional and industry dummies, size and share in exports.
Our theory predicts that the relationship between debt and barter should be observed if the firm is not too indebted. If the debt is very high (e.g. D 0 >λβ) then barter does not help to protect the working capital and any further increase in debt does not result in more barter. We will therefore run separate tests for the most indebted sub-samples.
We will also control the main alternative explanation of the positive relationship between debt and barter: that is that both debt and barter occur mostly in 'bad' firms. In the presence of the soft budget constraint, credit is allocated to bail out loss-making firms. E. Berglof and G. Roland (1998) emphasise the ex post injection of soft credit from banks to firms, which should be liquidated 21 . As a result, bank credit is allocated to loss makers. The healthier firms have little access, if any, to external finance 22 ; also, they tend to repay debt while lossmaking firms remain indebted. On the other hand, less productive firms are also less competitive in the cash market and are doomed to sell their output through the old networks. 20 Certainly, this is not a closed and consistent model with rational players: we have just looked at one end of the GKO cash flows. Building a general equilibrium of a Ponzy game is however not the purpose of this paper. We can only say that somewhere in the public or private sector, there must have been irrational traders who supported the high rate of return. 21 The crucial point is that, if the proportion of bad loans is high enough, the ex post benefits of bailing out are higher than the benefits of liquidation. 22 One reason suggested in S. Brana and M. Maurel (1999) is that in the presence of adverse selection, credit is rationed, healthier firms do not borrow.
Therefore they sell more through barter. To control this explanation of the link between barter and indebtedness, we estimate a system of three simultaneous equations.
In the first equation, we estimate the dependence of indebtedness on productivity (controlling for size, regional and industry dummies). We use the following proxies of productivity: the decline of the firm's output over the whole period of transition prior to the year for which we run the regression, and the rate of capacity utilisation. Both capture the extent to which the firm can add value in the market rather than command economy prices. According to the soft budget constraint theory, a decrease in productivity should lead to liquidation, but if the benefit of bailing out is higher for the bank 23 , then indebtedness increases.
In the second equation, we estimate the dependence of barter on the rate of capacity utilisation (again, controlling for other determinants of barter). This makes it possible to take into account the fact that less competitive firms are less involved in the cash market and therefore use barter more freely.
Given these two equations, we test whether the relationship between indebtedness and barter is still significant. This is our third equation.
Data description
The REB is a survey which has been conducted since 1992 24 . On a quarterly basis (REB quarterly survey), a sub-sample of the survey has been obtained for 1995 and 1996 only. About 170 to 210 firms considered representative in terms of geographic as well as sector localisation answer the REB quarterly questionnaire. An important bias is the predominance of privatised firms, as opposed to new private firms. In the 1996 sample, 18% were stateowned, 26% had a mixed property structure, and 56% were privatised former state-ownedenterprises.
The variables we used are summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix; they are either expressed in per cent of a monthly usual current level (br, utc) or with respect to a previous level set equal to 100 (dt0):
The REB barter variable br is the current share of barter in sales (as a percentage), for each firm at each time (t varies from t= first quarter of 1995 to t= last quarter of 1996). The proxy for indebtedness dt0 is the level of indebtedness towards banks, the level six months ago being set equal to 100. The output decline is captured by the capacity utilisation rate utc. The higher the utc is the more competitive the firm is in the market economy.
We shall also use the dataset Barter in Russian industrial firms (BRIF) built in the New Economic School Research Project " Non-Monetary Transactions in Russian Economy ". This dataset was created by matching the surveys of managers of Russian industrial firms conducted in 1996-98 by Serguei Tsoukhlo (Institute of Economies in Transition, Moscow) with the Goskomstat database of Russian firms (Federal Committee of Statistics of Russian Federation). Since Goskomstat data was most complete for 1996 and 1997 we ran regressions for the 1996 and 1997 data.
The barter data included six to seven hundred firms each year. The barter data is comprised of the answers given by firms' managers to the following (eight) questions: " how much of your firm's inputs (outputs) were paid in rubles, in dollars, in kind and in promissory notes? " The Goskomstat database includes compulsory statistical reports that all large and medium-size firms must submit to the Russian Federal Statistics Committee. There are over 16 thousand firms in the database. However, there are many missing items in the financial accounts. After matching barter data with the Goskomstat data we ended up with roughly three hundred observations in each year among which only about a hundred firms appeared both in 1996 and 1997.
As a proxy of debt we take the firm's total indebtedness in the beginning of the corresponding year divided. This variable (sum of line items 610 and 620 in the balance sheet) includes bank loans (610) and amounts owed to suppliers, subsidiaries, consolidated government, IOU holders, employees and other creditors (620).
In order to control for other explanations of barter we also include firms' size, export and market power, as well as regional and industry dummies in our regressions. As a proxy of size we take logarithm of annual sales. As for exports, we include share of exports in sales. The summary statistics and pairwise correlations are provided in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix. We also included regional and 2-digit industry dummies. 25 The industry dummies are described in Table A5 . As for the regions, we have only introduced dummies for Moscow and seven presidential districts but only Moscow's, Urals' and Siberia's dummies came out significantly different from the European Russia which we used as the base category.
Evidence from REB survey
The results of the OLS regressions for barter are presented in the Table 1 . In addition to indebtedness we also control the firm's size, measured as a number of employees (lab), and include regional and industry dummies. When we estimate the effect of indebtedness on the whole sample, the coefficient is positive but not significant. Our theory predicts that the coefficient must be significant if the firms are not too indebted. We exclude firms with dt0<200 (16 firms or less than six per cent of the sample) and indeed obtain a positive and significant coefficient. *** -significance at 1% level, ** -significance at 5% level, * -significance at 10% level Table 2 presents the estimations of the simultaneous equation model. We do find that when controlling for the negative relationship between indebtedness and capacity utilisation and the negative relationship between barter and capacity utilisation, barter still positively and significantly depends on capacity utilisation. *** -significance at 1% level, ** -significance at 5% level, * -significance at 10% level
The results again support the model. Less productive firms are more indebted; when a firm faces an increase in its rate of capacity utilisation, barter decreases; finally the correlation between indebtedness and barter is positive, as predicted by the model, even controlling for the first two relationships. The latter correlation is higher and more consistent in the simultaneous equation model rather than in OLS regressions.
3.4
Evidence from IET survey
We run OLS regressions for barter for 1996 and 1997. The results of the estimations are shown in the Table 3 . As our model predicts, barter positively and significantly depends on debt. Moreover, when we exclude the most indebted firms, the effect becomes stronger and the coefficient becomes more significant. Table 4 presents the results of estimations of the simultaneous equation model. Capacity utilisation has a negative and significant effect on both debt and barter, but even controlling for those effects, barter still positively and significantly depends on debt. Moreover, when the most indebted firms are excluded, the effect is much stronger. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between indebtedness and barter in Russian firms. One interesting feature of the model is that it draws a link between the liquidity shortage argument and that of poor creditor right protection. Our model incorporates the argument that barter helps to protect working capital needed for sustaining production and the argument that barter comes as a strategic reaction of managers that may be costly for outside investors.
We explicitly model the possibility of relaxing the liquidity constraint by re-financing debt.
Since the firm has a liquidity rather than a solvency problem, replenishing its working capital is socially efficient, so debt restructuring should be in the mutual interest of the firm and the creditors. However, the creditors face a difficult choice: postponing too much of the debt will provide incentives for the manager to divert cash rather than to finance the firm's working capital. Therefore the lack of any commitment not to divert cash becomes a constraint for debt restructuring. If debt overhang is too high, the negotiation fails and the debt is not restructured. This, in turn, provides ex ante incentives for the manager to prefer barter although barter involves higher transaction costs.
Another explanation for the failure of debt restructuring is the presence of the government bonds (GKO) bubble in [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . If the outside investment opportunity (GKO) yields a very high real interest rate, creditors will not be interested in refinancing the debt, which in turns provides managers with the incentives to use barter.
Our empirical analysis supports the predicted positive relationship between indebtedness and barter. Which of the two explanations of this relationship (the threat of cash diversion by the manager or the GKO bubble) is correct? Both are consistent with macro-economic evidence. The period of the highest GKO yields coincided with the highest levels of barter. Moreover, as the causality test in Brana and Maurel (1999) shows, higher real interest rates caused higher barter in 1995-98. On the other hand, the meltdown of August 1998 destroyed the GKO bubble bringing real interest rates to reasonably low levels. As one should have expected, barter has declined, too. But it has not disappeared altogether and is still much higher than in other economies.
Our model implies that hardening the bankruptcy procedures would have different effects in the presence and in the absence of a bubble. If the bubble is present, lack of bankruptcy leads to barter, which is definitely less efficient than money, but helps to protect the firm's working capital. Barter is a survival strategy that helps firms with high indebtedness to survive and keep producing. The returns on production are lower than the GKO yield but since the latter is the bubble, production may be socially efficient. On the other hand if there is no bubble, lack of effective bankruptcy procedures and creditor rights protection results in barter which is simply less efficient than monetary exchange. Our analysis suggests two policies that can decrease barter: (i) to avoid high-yield debt financing of the budget deficit and (ii) to continue the efforts to introduce effective bankruptcy procedures and protect creditor rights. 
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